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Abstract: 
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is known to represent a summary measure of tax efficiency 
costs, which means that further information about the behavioral components of the ETI is not 
required for its use in tax policy design. However, as there are response margins that may cause 
biases in the estimation of the elasticity, we advise against neglecting information about the 
composition of the behavior seized by the ETI. When using responses of the Norwegian self-
employed to the tax reform of 2006 for illustration, we discuss how four different responses relate to 
the overall ETI, given characteristics of the reform. Effects on working hours, on tax evasion, and 
from shifts in organizational form and across tax bases are discussed in terms of to what extent they 
represent sources to estimation bias, or enter into the ETI in a decompositional way. We provide 
empirical illustrations of the effects of each of these margins, and we show that the estimated ETI is 
biased downward because of organizational shifts. 
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Sammendrag 
Siden Martin Feldsteins artikkel fra 1995, der han brukte den amerikanske skattereformen fra 1986 
(under Reagan) til å identifisere hvor elastisk inntektene er i forhold til endringer i marginalskatten på 
inntekt (ETI), har det vært en omfattende aktivitet for å bringe frem tilsvarende elastisitetsestimater fra 
andre økonomier. Årsaken til dette er blant annet at ETI-en oppsummerer det totale effektivitetstapet 
ved en økning i marginalskatten, uten at en trenger å diskutere nærmere hvilke type responser som 
leder frem til endringen i inntekt. Det vil si at en behøver ikke ta stilling til om responsen i inntekt 
skyldes for eksempel endringer arbeidstid, lønnsøkninger som følge av økt arbeidsinnsats eller 
endringer i skatteunndragelse. I dette arbeidet advarer vi mot at noen slike underliggende responser 
(fanget opp av ETI’en) kan være kilder til skjeve ETI-estimater. Vi diskuterer dette problemet ved å se 
på i hvor stor grad inntektene til norske selvstendig næringsdrivende responderer på endring i 
marginalskatten, der skatteendringene ved skattereformen i 2006 anvendes i identifikasjonen av 
hvordan skatteendringer influerer på inntekt. Vi gir beskrivelser av hvordan skattereformen (separat) 
virker på arbeidstid, skatteunndragelser, organisasjonsmessige skift og skift mellom å ta ut 
kompensasjon i næringsinntekt og kapitalinntekt. Det argumenteres for at de to siste responsene kan gi 
skjeve ETI-estimater, mens effekter på arbeidstid og skatteunndragelser representerer konvensjonelle 
dekomponeringer av elastisiteten. Vi finner relativt lave ETI-estimater for de selvstendig 
næringsdrivende, og vårt hovedestimat er på om lag 0,15. Dette estimatet er imidlertid ikke konsistent 
estimert, og det ville ha vært høyere, om lag 0,18, dersom en tar hensyn til at skattereformen også 
hadde innvirkning på endringer av organisasjonsform, dvs. skattereformen gjorde det mindre attraktivt 
for selvstendig næringsdrivende å skifte til aksjeselskap. Resultatene gir videre støtte til at 
skatteunndragelsene har blitt noe redusert etter skattereformen og at mesteparten av responsen i 
inntekt skyldes at arbeidstiden har økt etter reformen. 
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1. Introduction 
After Feldstein (1995), it has become widespread to obtain estimates of income responses to tax 
changes by analyzing panel data over a tax reform period, exploiting the variation in changes in 
marginal net-of-tax rates across individuals to obtain estimates of the elasticity of taxable income 
(ETI). In the most straightforward version, one identifies a “control group” that represents the change 
in income which would have occurred to the “treatment group”, if the tax reform did not take place. 
As the ETI in principle captures all tax induced responses, and as estimates can be derived by standard 
econometric tools, deriving estimates of the ETI from micro data has become a popular empirical 
strategy for measuring the efficiency costs of taxation (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012; Slemrod and 
Gillitzer, 2014).  
 
In the case when private and social costs of changes in the marginal tax rate are equal, the ETI can be 
seen as a “sufficient statistic” for welfare analysis, as the optimal tax rate is a simple function of the 
ETI (Feldstein, 1999; Saez, 2001; Chetty, 2009). Then the behavioral anatomy of the response does 
not matter for measuring tax efficiency costs. However, such simple relationships do not typically 
exist. One reason is that the social implications of the behavioral responses to tax changes differ to the 
extent there are external effects involved. Externalities may, for example, arise because the ETI 
captures highly valued activities, as charitable giving, or because it consists of detrimental activities, 
as tax evasion. However, the ETI literature includes contributions on how ETI estimates still can be 
used to measure tax efficiency effects in the presence of behavioral diversities, see Chetty (2009) and 
Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014).  
 
Further, it is well established that the ETI is a function of the environment from which it is derived, 
and therefore can be seen as subject to policy control (Slemrod, 1996; Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002; 
Giertz, 2009; Fack and Landais, 2016). It means that policy-makers often have a wide range of policy 
instruments to control different margins of the response, and it implies that the broader tax system 
design influences the overall ETI through the components of behavioral response.1  
 
In the present study we shall direct attention to another implication of multiple response margins in the 
ETI literature, namely that the econometric identification of the ETI is sensitive to what type of 
response margins that are involved in the identification. There are well-known econometric challenges 
                                                     
1 See also Doerrenberg, Peichl and Siegloch (2016) on the use of the ETI as a sufficient statistics in the presence of deduction 
possibilities. 
5 
concerning the identification of the ETI, given that net-of-tax rate depends on income and therefore is 
clearly endogenous, see Auten and Carroll (1999), Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), Gruber and Saez 
(2002), and Kopczuk (2005). Here we warn that responses may represent source to estimation bias in 
the identification of the ETI. The econometric challenges come in the form of endogenous sample 
selections and omitted variables, thus, representing violations of assumptions for consistent 
identification of the ETI. Thus, the main message of the present study is that the behavioral anatomy 
of the ETI may matter and should not be neglected, as there are response margins that may cause 
estimation bias.  
 
We discuss the various underlying behavioral responses empirically by employing micro data on the 
Norwegian self-employed, exploiting the tax changes due to tax reform of 2006 in the identification. 
The self-employed are chosen as it is typically acknowledged that they have wider scope for 
behavioral response than the wage earners (Heim, 2010).2 Empirical evidence of four separate 
response dimensions are discussed: effects on working hours, income underreporting (or tax evasion), 
organizational shifts, and shifts between tax bases within the personal income tax schedule. We obtain 
evidence about the magnitudes of the response margins and place them in a “response account”, 
distinguishing between “causes to estimation bias” and “components of the ETI”, where the latter type 
relates to the ETI in a conventional decompositional manner. 
 
Before further explaining why some response dimensions may represent sources to estimation bias, 
and others may not, let us briefly restate the standard method of obtaining ETI estimates. The ETI 
provides an intensive margin response, which is (conventionally) identified by addressing information 
on taxable income over a period where there is variation in the net-of-tax rate (1 minus the marginal 
tax rate), generated by a tax reform. Thus, inspired by Feldstein (1995), a great majority of empirical 
studies of the ETI have used panel data in the identification,3 where first differenced income for each 
individual in the panel is regressed against an expression for the change in the net-of-tax rate. To allow 
for the new tax prices being absorbed by the agents, it has become standard to use three-year span in 
data, from pre-reform to post-reform. Following Auten and Carroll (1999), Moffitt and Wilhelm 
(2000), and Gruber and Saez (2002), most studies use an instrument for the tax change based on 
                                                     
2 Whereas estimates of the ETI for wage earners have been obtained for a wide selection of countries, see Auten and Carroll 
(1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) for the U.S., and Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), Blomquist and Selin (2012), and Kleven 
and Schultz (2014) for Norway, Sweden and Denmark, respectively, there are relatively few studies of the ETI for the self-
employed. Exceptions include Wu (2005), Blow and Preston (2002), Heim (2010), Kleven and Schultz (2014). Note also that 
Saez (2010), le Maire and Schjerning (2013) and Bastani and Selin (2014) estimate taxable income elasticities for the self-
employed, but use bunching techniques for identification. 
3 However, Lindsey (1987) used repeated cross-sections. See also Goolsbee (1999). 
6 
statutory tax changes, obtained by letting the tax law at time t and time t+3 (mechanically) be applied 
to the same pre-reform income, a employ predicted values through a two-stage-least-squares 
procedure.  
 
At this point, we use the organizational shift margin to illustrate that the estimation of the ETI is 
sensitive to the type of responses involved. It follows from the standard data selection criteria of the 
ETI framework that data are established by conditioning on being self-employed in both periods, t and 
t+3. This is an innocuous sample selection condition as long as the tax changes do not induce 
taxpayers to move out of the personal income tax base. However, several studies, as Slemrod (1995), 
Gordon and Slemrod (2000), Goolsbee (2000), Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2010), Edmark and Gordon 
(2013) and Harju and Matikka (2016) advise against ignoring organizational shifts when discussing 
tax responses. The organizational shift aspect is clearly critical in the present context, given that we 
use the Norwegian tax reform of 2006 in the identification of effects, and the tax schedule prior to the 
2006-reform is known to have included incentives to shift organizational form, see Thoresen and 
Alstadsæter (2010). Taxpayers moved out of the so-called split model for the self-employed, and took 
advantage of the lower taxation of capital income (dividends). As the Norwegian tax reform of 2006 
involved tax changes meant to abolish these incentives (Sørensen, 2005), both through a reduction in 
the marginal tax rate on labor income and taxation of dividend income, more business owners likely 
remain in the self-employment data sample after the reform, compared to the counterfactual situation, 
without a reform. As high-income taxpayers were overrepresented among those who shifted out of 
self-employment prior to the reform (Thoresen and Alstadsæter, 2010), we get a non-random addition 
to the treatment group because of self-selection. If not precautionary measures are taken, we are in 
danger of erroneously attributing increases in income due to more high-income individuals staying 
self-employed to the reduction in marginal tax rates, causing bias in the estimation of the ETI. Thus, 
we have what is commonly referred to as self-selection bias in the estimation of the ETI, reflected in a 
behavioral component of the ETI.   
 
We are able to investigate effects of organizational shifts on the ETI because of the richness in the data 
we have had available for this study. The main data source is the yearly Income Statistics for Families 
and Persons, which is based on information from administrative registers (as the Register of Tax 
Returns), covers the whole population, includes a large set of control variables, and can be turned into 
a panel data set through personal id numbers. Observations during the period from 2001 to 2010 are 
used in the present analysis. Further, we combine the income data with three other data sources in 
order to explore the extent of organizational shifts: information from the Business and Enterprise 
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Register, the Shareholder Register and the End of the Year Certificate Register. By combining 
information from these data sources, we can establish whom among the taxpayers having moved out 
of self-employment to be shareholder in the same firm as they are employed. A difference in these 
movements from the pre-reform to the post-reform period is taken as corroborative evidence of a 
measurement problem in the estimation of the ETI, expected to cause biased estimation results. 
 
In contrast, in terms of a response account of the ETI, we argue that the effect on working hours 
relates to the ETI in a conventional decompositional sense. We estimate a working hours tax elasticity 
and show how this response estimate enter into the relationship by employing repeated cross-sectional 
data, derived from the Labour Force Surveys. Correspondingly, we categorize tax evasion as a 
standard component of the ETI. We illustrate the effect of tax evasion, empirically, by using the so-
called expenditure approach (Pissarides and Weber, 1989) for identification of the tax evasion 
component. This methodology is based on comparison of food consumption and income among wage 
earners and the self-employed, under the assumption that evasion is found only in the latter group. 
Information from the Survey of Consumer Expenditure is used to estimate Engel curves for food for 
wage earners and the self-employed, which in turn are used to calculate the amount by which reported 
income must be scaled up by in order to obtain true income levels for tax evaders. As we have data 
both for pre-reform and post-reform periods, a difference in the estimated tax evasion between the two 
periods can be attributed to the increase in the net-of-tax rate after the 2006-reform, engendering a tax 
evasion component of the overall ETI. 
 
With respect to base shifts between labor income and capital income bases, one may argue that the 
main problem is that capital income is left out of our definition of taxable income, but this is similar to 
several other studies, such as Feldstein (1995) and Heim (2010). Analyses based on U.S. data often do 
not include capital gains in taxable income. Similar to as for organizational shifts, base shifts within 
the personal income represent a fiscal externality effect, which means that revenue effects are 
misleading if not accounting for revenue effects working through other tax bases. However, here we 
draw attention to another complicating factor in the identification of the ETI: effects of 
contemporaneous tax changes. Given that the tax reform we use in the identification of the ETI also 
involves a change in the capital income taxation, the lack of control for the simultaneous effect from 
other tax changes, gives bias in the estimation of the ETI – we may characterize it as an omitted 
variable bias. We discuss this component by addressing empirical evidence about the income 
composition of the treatment group.  
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Norwegian tax schedule and 
the reform of 2006, which is used in the identification of the ETI. Further, in Section 3, the empirical 
approaches to obtain estimates of the effects of different response margins and the overall ETI are 
presented, before estimation results for the different response margins are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Norwegian dual income tax and the reform of 2006 
The Norwegian dual income tax schedule in 2006 is used to obtain tax response estimates. A dual 
income tax schedule combines a low proportional tax rate on capital income and progressive tax rates 
on labor income, and was introduced in Norway by the 1992-reform. Thus, as the system involves 
separate rate schedules for different income components, there are certainly prospects of obtaining a 
variety of behavioral effects when reforming the system.  
 
The dual income tax proliferated throughout the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, and the 
Norwegian version had a flat 28 percent tax rate levied on corporate income, capital and labor income, 
coupled with a social security contribution and a progressive surtax applicable to labor income. The 
post-1992 schedule implied that taxpayers receiving dividends were given full credit for taxes paid at 
the corporate level, and the capital gain tax system exempted gains attributable to retained earnings 
taxed at the corporate level. These separate schedules for capital and labor income created obvious 
incentives for taxpayers to recharacterize labor income as capital income. To limit such tax avoidance, 
the 1992-reform introduced the so-called “split model” for the self-employed, partnerships and closely 
held firms.4 Rules were established for dividing business income into capital and labor income by 
imputing a return to business assets and attributing the residual income to labor. Labor income was 
subject to a social security contribution and a two-tier surtax. 
 
Between 1992 and 2004, both the threshold for the second tier of the surtax and marginal rates 
increased, resulting in the statutory marginal tax rates as shown for 2004 (the last year before the 
reform) in Figure 1, with 55.3 percent at the maximum.5 Under the split model, imputed return to the 
capital invested in the firm is calculated by multiplying the value of the capital assets by a fixed rate of 
return on capital. This imputed return to capital is taxed by the corporate tax rate, which also equals 
the capital income tax rate at the individual level, fixed at 28 percent in the period under consideration 
here. Business profit net of imputed return to capital is the imputed return to labor, which is taxed as 
                                                     
4 The latter is defined as businesses in which the active owner holds more than two-thirds of the shares. 
5 Use 1 USD = 6.42 Norwegian kroner (NOK) and 1 Euro = 8.05 NOK to convert to US dollars and Euros.  
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labor income, so-called personal income, independently of whether the income is retained in the firm 
or transferred to the owner.  
 
A main ambition of the Norwegian dual income tax was to tax labor income with a single schedule, 
independent of whether the income came from regular wage payments or was obtained by the split 
model. However, the 1990s saw increasing pressure on the dual income tax system, resulting in 
numerous “patches”.6 For example, a distinction between liberal professions (lawyers, dentists, 
doctors and other independent contractors delivering services to the public) and other professions was 
introduced in terms of ceilings, from which labor income part is taxed by the capital income tax rate 
(28 percent) only. The special treatment of the liberal occupations was abolished in 1998, and the low-
tax income intervals are kept for other professions until the split model was eliminated in 2004.7 In 
Figure 1, which describes schedules before and after the reform, the remarkable system for non-liberal 
professions prior to the reform is seen in the lower panel. 
Figure 1.  Marginal tax rates for the self-employed in 2004 and 2006. Income < 1 mill. NOK in 
upper panel, income in interval [0.8,10] mill. NOK in lower panel   
 
 
                                                     
6 Christiansen (2004) sees this as resulting from political games motivated in part by the concerns of politicians of various 
colors with special interest groups. 
7 This particular schedule represents a separate opportunity for identification of response to tax changes, but, as seen, it only 
applies to very large incomes. 
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*1 mill NOK ≈ $ 156,000, ≈ € 124,000, in 2006.   
 
The reform of 2006 emerged as an attempt to create a system that would prevent taxpayers from 
transforming labor income into capital income, to benefit from the lower flat rate applied to the latter; 
see Sørensen (2005) for the wider background to the reform and steps taken to adjust the dual income 
tax. Harmonization of the marginal tax rates on capital income and labor income is achieved by 
cutting top marginal tax rates on wage income, see Figure 1. This tax cut represents an increase in the 
net-of-tax rate for most taxpayers. However, as already mentioned, some groups of the self-employed 
experienced a decrease in the net-of-tax rate after the reform (see the lower panel). After the revision 
of the dual income tax in 2006, owners of sole proprietorships are taxed under the so-called self-
employment model (foretaksmodellen), which shares important similarities with the split-model. 
According to the new rules, business income from a sole proprietorship activity in excess of the risk-
free return allowance, calculated on the invested capital, is taxed as imputed personal income and is 
subject to surtax and social security contribution.8  
 
The other initiative to curb the incentives to shift income comes from increases in the taxation of 
dividends and capital gains. Individual dividend incomes and capital gains above a rate-of-return 
allowance, that is, on profits above a risk free rate of return, are taxed at 48.2 percent at the maximum 
                                                     
8 The basis for calculation of the risk-free rate is the arithmetic average observed on Treasury bills with 3 months maturity, as 
published by the Central Bank every year. 
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after the reform in 2006. Thus, this is a clear example of policy-makers having access to several tools 
in the tax optimization.  
3. Problematic responses? 
3.1 Estimation of the overall ETI 
In this section, we discuss to what extent the various response margins reflected in the overall ETI 
represent sources to estimation bias, or if they are conventional components of the ETI. Estimates of 
the overall ETI for the self-employed are few, compared to both results for wage earners (see Footnote 
2) and to the literature on how tax changes affect decisions to enter or exit self-employment, see 
reviews in Parker (2009) and Heim (2010). Heim (2010) and Kleven and Schultz (2014) provide ETI 
estimates for the self-employed by using the same methodology as employed here, whereas Saez 
(2010), le Maire and Schjerning (2013) and Bastani and Selin (2014) obtain ETI estimates by using 
bunching techniques. 
 
Subsequent to Feldstein (1995), a standard estimation procedure for the identification of the ETI has 
been developed, benefitting from contributions by, among others, Auten and Carroll (1999), Moffitt 
and Wilhelm (2000), Gruber and Saez (2002), and Kopczuk (2005).9 Recall that in the estimation of 
the elasticity,  𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 1−𝜏𝑥 𝛿𝑥𝛿(1−𝜏) (𝜏 is the marginal tax rate, 𝑥 is income), the main data source is 
income panel data, covering a period with assorted variation in the net-of-tax rate across individuals. 
As one has settled down on measuring three-year differences in income, the estimated equation can be 
specified as 
  log �𝑥𝑖,𝑡+3
𝑥𝑖𝑡
� = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log �1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡+31 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡 � + 𝐵𝑖′𝜃 + 𝑀𝑖𝑡′ 𝜂 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , (3.1) 
 
 
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+3 are taxable income for individual 𝑖 before and after the reform (𝑡 and 𝑡 + 3), 1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡 and 1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡+3 are the corresponding net-of-tax-rates, 𝛼𝑡 is a time specific effect, 𝐵𝑖 is a vector 
of individual observed characteristics that are time-invariant (but may change relationship with income 
over time), and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observed time-variant variables. The error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed.  
                                                     
9 Note that there is another acronym too: Goolsbee (1999) refers to studies in this field as belonging to the “new tax 
responsiveness literature” (NTR).  
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As already denoted, the marginal tax rate in this set-up is clearly endogenous, and studies typically 
employ the change in net-of-tax rates based on fixed first period income as instrument in an IV 
regression, see Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002). The instrument is obtained by 
letting the tax rate in year 𝑡 + 3 be applied to income in year 𝑡 (base year), inflated by the average 
income growth. This means that log �1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡+3
1−𝜏𝑖𝑡
� is instrumented by  log �1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡+3𝐼
1−𝜏𝑖𝑡
�, where 𝜏𝑖,𝑡+3𝐼  
symbolizes the marginal tax rate in year 𝑡 + 3 when applied to income of year 𝑡.  
 
The difficulty with this representation of the tax change is that log �1−𝜏𝑖,𝑡+3𝐼
1−𝜏𝑖𝑡
�  is likely correlated with 
the differenced error in Equation (3.1), see discussion in Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000). Mean reversion 
stems from individuals with temporarily high levels of income in period t, and therefore mistakenly 
placed in the treatment group with large reductions in marginal tax rates, returning to their normal 
income levels in period 𝑡 + 3. To account for the mean reversion bias, Auten and Carroll (1999) 
suggest including log 𝑥𝑖𝑡, log of base year income, as an additional control variable, 
 log �𝑥𝑖,𝑡+3
𝑥𝑖𝑡
� = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log �1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡+31 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡 � + 𝐵𝑖′𝜃 + 𝑀𝑖𝑡′ 𝜂 + 𝜌 log 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  . (3.2) 
 
Further, Gruber and Saez (2002) propose adding a ten piece spline in the log of base year income 
(each decile of the income distribution) to account for (exogeneous) developments in the income 
distribution, and Kopczuk (2005) suggests including splines in the lagged base year income and in the 
deviation of lagged base year income from base year income. These approaches can be seen as 
 log �𝑥𝑖,𝑡+3
𝑥𝑖𝑡
� = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log �1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡+31 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡 � + 𝐵𝑖′𝜃 + 𝑀𝑖𝑡′ 𝜂 + 𝜇𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 log 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (3.3) 
 
in the Gruber and Saez specification, and 
 
log �𝑥𝑖,𝑡+3
𝑥𝑖𝑡
� = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log �1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡+31 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡 � + 𝐵𝑖′𝜃 + 𝑀𝑖𝑡′ 𝜂 + 𝜙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 log 𝑥𝑖𝑡+ 𝜋𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 log �𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑥𝑖𝑡
� + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , (3.4) 
 
in the Kopczuk version. It follows that 𝜇 and 𝜙 are vectors of parameters. In Section 4 we shall 
present results for estimations of Equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), using 2SLS and the net-of-tax rate 
instrument as specified above, also controlling for a number of individual characteristics (included in 
𝐵𝑖
′ and 𝑀𝑖𝑡′ ). 
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It follows from this exposition that the exogeneity of the tax change instrument is the key condition for 
consistent estimation of the ETI. Estimation bias appears when there are systematic differences across 
income groups correlated with, but not caused by, the tax reform under investigation. In terms of the 
tax reform exploited in the identification here, the identification relies on the control group, people 
with less than approximately 375,000 NOK in self-employment income in 2004, see Figure 1, 
representing a valid control group for the “treated”.  
 
As revealed by this brief review, there are obvious methodological weaknesses and challenges in the 
standard procedure of obtaining ETI estimates. Here, we would like to draw attention to additional 
problems in the estimation of the elasticity, namely that some of the underlying response margins may 
represent causes to inconsistent estimates.     
3.2 Response in working hours 
Let us start with what we believe is a less problematic response margin. Of course, there may be 
effects on working hours that work through the other response dimensions (see on), for example 
because of shifts, but we maintain that, at least with respect to the way we identify the working hours 
response here, there are no reasons to believe that this margin is contaminated. Thus, we shall classify 
this response margin as a conventional component of the ETI.    
 
To obtain empirical evidence about this response margin is, however, challenging. Scarcity of data 
sets with a panel dimension on working hours most likely explains why we see fewer studies (along 
the same lines as described here) with changes in working hours as the dependent variable.10 However, 
cross-sectional data can straightforwardly be used to obtain ETI estimates, as emphasized by Saez, 
Slemrod, and Giertz (2012), and here we use ten cross-sections from the Labor Force Surveys 
(Statistics Norway, 2003), covering the period 2001–2010, to identify the response in working hours 
to the tax change.  
 
Thus, the ambition is to obtain an estimate of 𝑒ℎ = 1−𝜏ℎ 𝛿ℎ𝛿(1−𝜏), derived from repeated cross-sections. 
An estimate of an elasticity for working hours, 𝑒ℎ, which is comparable to the overall ETI in a 
decompositional context is derived by accounting for taxable income also reflecting other response 
margins. Then, after adjustments, an estimate of  𝑒ℎ can be contrasted to an estimate of 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 (of 
                                                     
10 Of course, the most important reason is that effects on income is the preferred measure for estimating efficiency costs, as 
made clear by Feldstein (1995; 1999).  
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Section 3.1), seen as 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 =  𝑒ℎ + 𝑒𝑟1, where we expect  𝑒ℎ to be positive, and 𝑒𝑟1 is the remaining 
response, which can be negative or positive, dependent on effects of other margins. 
Given that we have access to information about working hours through cross sectional data, 
the identification strategy relies on assigning individuals to the “treatment” and “control” groups, and 
applying the standard difference-in-differences estimator for identification.11 This framework can be 
seen as, 
 ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝜆𝑄𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑄𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖′𝜃 + 𝑀𝑖𝑡′ 𝜂 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , (3.5) 
 
where ℎ𝑖𝑡 is working hours for individual 𝑖 in the cross-section at time 𝑡, 𝛼 is a constant, 𝐷𝑖 is a 
dummy variable for belonging to the treated, and 𝑄𝑡 is a time dummy variable for the post-reform 
period. As for the estimation of the overall ETI, 𝐵𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 refer to individual characteristics (but here 
the distinction between time-invariant and time-variant characteristics is not important), and 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term.  Now 𝛿 measures the effect of the tax reform on working hours. Given that we in this part 
of the analysis uses cross-sectional data instead of data with a panel dimension (as for the overall ETI 
in the previous subsection), the econometric identification procedure differs. However, based on the 
estimate of 𝛿, we provide measures of the hours of work elasticity comparable to the ETI.   
 
The allocation of observations into treatment and control groups is done by using individual 
calculations of the net-of-tax rate, similar to the instrument used in Section 3.1. As data sets contain 
personal identification numbers, we can add information obtained from the Income Statistics data to 
the observations of the Labor Force Surveys. 
3.3 Contribution from tax evasion 
Next, we would like to see how the tax evasion component relates to the ETI for the self-employed, 
and enters into to the overall response account. The self-employed are known to be disproportionately 
more involved in tax evasion than wage earners. In fact, the identification of the tax evasion 
component, in many studies, relies on wage earners not evading. But are there reasons to caution 
against this dimension in terms of estimation inconsistency? In other words, are there reasons to reject 
the equal trend assumption of the ETI methodology? One reason, given that high-income self-
employed are more involved in tax evasion than others, see Nygård, Slemrod and Thoresen (2016), 
could then be new initiatives by the tax administration to reduce evasion. However, we have no priors 
in this direction, and tax evasion is here assigned to the decompositional part of the ETI.  
                                                     
11 Angrist and Pischke (2009) provide several examples of use of this technique. 
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It is not obvious how changes in marginal tax rates affect tax evasion, and thereby it is 
uncertain whether the tax evasion component of the overall ETI estimate holds a negative or positive 
sign. The theoretical literature, as Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), offers no clear 
answers,12 and empirical findings are mixed (Freire-Serén and Panadés, 2013). Some of the early 
studies, as Clotfelter (1983), find increased tax evasion for higher marginal tax rates. More recently, 
Kleven et al. (2011) obtain a very small positive relationship, based on a randomized tax enforcement 
experiment in Denmark, whereas Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and Peter (2009) find a strong 
positive relationship.  
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the self-employment ETI literature (Heim, 2010; Doerrenberg and Duncan, 
2014) adopt a perspective where reported income is increasing in the net-of-tax rate, i.e., that tax 
evasion is increasing in the marginal tax rate. This means that ETI estimates for the self-employed are 
larger than for wage earners if there is a discernible effect on tax evasion from the change in the 
marginal tax rate. Thus, in a synthesis of the components discussed so far (where 𝑒𝑟2 is the remaining 
response), 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 =  𝑒ℎ + 𝑒𝑒𝑣 + 𝑒𝑟2, if anything, we expect that there is a positive tax evasion 
contribution, 𝑒𝑒𝑣, to the overall ETI, similar to the working hours component.
13  
 
We obtain an estimate of 𝑒𝑒𝑣 by addressing estimates of tax evasion before and after the 2006-reform, 
using the so-called expenditure approach (Pissarides and Weber, 1989). It builds on one group 
reporting income correctly and another not, but both groups reporting food expenditures truthfully. 
Thus, this part of the analysis involves the use of consumption data from the Survey of Consumer 
Expenditure (Holmøy and Lillegård, 2014). Under the assumption that the two groups share the same 
preferences for food, given a set of observable characteristics, estimates on the degree of 
underreporting among evading households are obtained by exploiting observations on income and 
food expenditures. More precisely, a common point of departure is the log-linear Engel function, log𝐶ℎ = 𝑍ℎ′ 𝜓 + 𝜉 log𝑌ℎ∗,  where log𝐶ℎ is the log of food expenditure for household, h, 𝑍ℎ is a set of 
observable household characteristics, and log𝑌ℎ∗ is the log of “true” disposable income.14 A standard 
assumption is that underreporting takes place at a constant fraction, such that 𝑌ℎ∗ = 𝑘𝑌ℎ, where 𝑌ℎ is 
                                                     
12 In the seminal model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) a tax increase has two contradicting effects on tax evasion: the 
return to cheating goes up, but at the same time it lowers (full compliance) post-tax income, which most likely make people 
more risk averse.  
13 See also Kuka (2014) on obtaining a tax evasion component, but with the use of bunching techniques.  
14 Thus, reflecting that the household is the economic unit in the consumption data.  
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the reported income, and there is underreporting if 𝑘 > 1. Here, as in Engström and Holmlund (2009), 
the following reduced form specification is employed,15 
 log𝐶ℎ = 𝑍ℎ′ 𝜓 + 𝜇 log𝑌ℎ + 𝜅𝑆𝐸ℎ + 𝑢ℎ , (3.6) 
where hSE  is a dummy for being self-employed. A positive 𝜅 suggests that the self-employed 
underreport income, and the number which can be used to multiply reported self-employment income 
to obtain “true income”, is given by  𝑘 = 𝜅
𝜇
;  the relationship between the shift parameter, 𝜅, and the 
slope of the Engel curve, 𝜇. It follows that estimates of 𝑘 before and after the 2006-reform are used to 
give an estimate of the 𝑒𝑒𝑣 component of the ETI. 
3.4 Organizational shifts generate measurement problem 
Now, we direct attention to how we obtain information about the two dimensions that potentially 
impose biases in the estimation of the ETI, namely organizational shifts and income shifting between 
tax bases. Given that high-income taxpayers were overrepresented among those who shifted out of 
self-employment prior to the reform (Thoresen and Alstadsæter, 2010), and because of the tax changes 
of the 2006 tax reform, more high-income business owners likely remain in the self-employment data 
sample after the reform. Thus, as already denoted, we get a non-random addition to the treatment 
group because of self-selection, and the organizational shift response margin therefore enforces a 
measurement problem in the identification of the ETI. We would like to obtain an estimate of 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 in 
the response account that is not contaminated by shifting behavior, say 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡∗ . This effect has been 
addressed in several studies from the U.S. too. For instance, at the same time of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which has been used in several studies of the ETI in the U.S., and which gave substantial 
reductions in the top marginal tax rate, there were large shifts of business income from so-called C 
corporations to so-called S corporations (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000).  
 
We explore the extent of organizational shifts before and after the tax reform by utilizing information 
from three different registers: the Business and Enterprise Register, the Shareholder Register and the 
End of the Year Certificate Register. By combing information from these three data sources with the 
income data, each individual is linked to companies, in terms of ownership, employment and transfers 
of dividends. In turn, these data are used to distinguish between individuals who move out of out of 
self-employment because of a “real” change in occupation (i.e., decide to take on paid employment), 
and those who turn up as wage earners because they have decided to run their businesses as 
                                                     
15 As both income and 𝑘 are assumed to be stochastic according to Pissarides and Weber (1989), there are more 
complications involved when obtaining estimates of 𝑘, discussed with respect to Norwegian data in Nygård, Slemrod and 
Thoresen (2016). 
17 
incorporated firms. Thus, we attribute fewer organizational shifts after the reform to the tax changes of 
the reform. 
3.5 Shifting between tax bases 
In addition to shifts in organizational form, incomes of the self-employed are likely directly affected 
by the harmonization of marginal tax rates on self-employment income and capital income after the 
reform. The self-employed then to a larger degree, ceteris paribus, choose to be paid in terms of 
business income instead of dividend income. Such effects have been reported in previous analyses of 
the Norwegian dual income tax, see, for example, Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009) and Alstadsæter and 
Jacob (2015).16 One reason for income shifting representing a proble m in the present context is that 
capital income is left out of our definition of taxable income, but this is similar to what is seen in 
several other studies, as Feldstein (1995) and other analyses based on U.S. data. However, here we 
would like to put forward the effect of contemporaneous tax changes in the identification of the ETI; 
in this case, the taxation of capital gains and dividends after the reform of 2006, see Section 2. As self-
employment income does not include income from other capital sources, the dependent income 
variable potentially picks up effects of base shifts after the reform. This effect is therefore representing 
another potential source for bias in the estimation of 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡, which we may characterize as an omitted 
variable problem, as it is caused by the lack of control for the effect working through the changed 
capital taxation. 
 
In this part of the analysis, traces of response due to tax base shifts are searched for by examining how 
the self-employed, in the treatment group, with large capital incomes, prior to the reform, respond 
compared to their self-employment counterparts, also in the treatment group, with less income from 
capital. Relatively large responses in the high-capital income group can be seen as indicative evidence 
of contribution from tax base shifts, which represent a source to bias in the estimation. Thus, we shall 
discuss this issue by providing evidence of how the labor income and the capital income of taxpayers 
who are in the treatment group develop over time (before and after the reform). 
                                                     
16 See Christiansen and Tuomala (2008) for a discussion of consequences of income shifting for optimal taxation.  
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4. The overall ETI and its components 
4.1 The ETI of the Norwegian self-employed 
As already denoted, there are numerous studies of the responsiveness of wage earners using the 
standard method to derive estimates of the ETI, whereas there are relatively few estimates of the ETI 
for the self-employed. Two recent studies of the ETI for the self-employed are Heim (2010) and 
Kleven and Schultz (2014). Heim suggests that the overall elasticity is around 0.9 for the U.S., and 
identifies a “real” elasticity part of approximately 0.4 when controlling for tax evasion.17 Kleven and 
Schultz, using data for Denmark, find that the total elasticity of taxable income is about twice as large 
for the self-employed compared to the wage earners. However, both elasticity estimates are relatively 
small, and approximately 0.1 for the self-employed.18  
 
In the present study, we benefit from having access to large administrative datasets, close to 75,000 
self-employed each year, based on information from income tax returns (Statistics Norway, 2005). 
Self-employment is defined by conditioning on both self-employment income being higher than wage 
income and yearly income being larger than 100,000 NOK ($16,000 or £12,500). See Table A.1 and 
Table A.2 in the Appendix for summary statistics. As we use data for the period 2001–2010, we have 
access to information about 400,000–500,000 three year differences in the estimation of the ETI. This 
also means that observations from periods without any major changes in the net-of-tax rates are 
included.  
 
It is a main problem in this type of studies that the identification of the effect of the net-of-tax rate 
often becomes blurred, as both the mean reversion control and the tax change instrument depend on 
income. This problem is alleviated here by including periods both with and without tax changes in the 
estimation, and it is also reduced by the tax burden depending on other characteristics than income 
alone. With respect to the latter, information about type of profession, given the different tax treatment 
of liberal and non-liberal professions (see Figure 1) is used, and it is also helpful that marginal tax 
rates are lower for people located in the northern part of Norway.  
 
                                                     
17 Heim (2010) distinguishes between a real response part and an evasion part by adopting estimates of Clotfelter (1993) and 
Joulfaian and Rider (1998) for the latter.  
18 Of course, one should not necessarily find similar response estimates across countries and across studies. One obvious 
source to variation in estimates is the size of the tax reform used in the identification of effects, as discussed by Chetty 
(2012). However, as the literature seems to suggest stronger responses in the U.S. than in the Scandinavian countries, this is 
worth taking a closer look at in the future. See also Kleven (2014). 
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Table 1 presents estimation results for five different specifications. As expected, IV-estimation 
without any mean reversion control gives negative ETI estimates, see column (1). Estimation results 
for Equations (3.2)–(3.4) (see Section 3) are reported in columns (2)–(4), demonstrating that results to 
some extent are sensitive with respect to the mean reversion control technique used.19 However, all 
estimates point to relatively small effects, in the range from 0.09 to 0.15. These estimates are not far 
from those Kleven and Schultz (2014) found for Denmark, and as them, we find results which indicate 
that the self-employed are somewhat more tax responsive than the wage earners, when using findings 
of Thoresen and Vattø (2015) as evidence for the tax responsiveness of Norwegian wage earners (over 
the same reform period). 
 
Table 1. Overall ETI estimation results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net-of-tax rate -0.963*** 0.123*** 0.091*** 0.152*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
Age -0.008*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Age squared 0.6×10-4*** -0.6×10-4*** -0.6×10-4*** -0.3×10 4*** 
 (0.7×10-5) (0.9*10-5) (0.9*10-5) (0.9*10-5) 
     
Male -0.006*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.066*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Children 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Married 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Norwegian born -0.003 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Log of period t (Auten/Carroll)  X   
     
Splines of log of period t income 
(Gruber/Saez) 
 
Splines of log t‐1 income and log deviation 
between t‐1 and t incomes (Kopczuk) 
   
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
N 488,258 488,258 488,258 416,735 
Instrumental variable estimation (2SLS). Additional control variables: dummy variables for educational field, length of 
education, county and years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                                                     
19 Application of the instrumentation method of Weber (2014), in combination with the mean reversion control method of 
Kopczuk (2005), gives results close to those reported in Table 1. 
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4.2 Estimation results for working hours 
As explained in Section 3, due to constraints in the access to information about hours of work for the 
self-employed, estimates of the response in working hours are obtained by using information from 
repeated cross-sections, derived from the Labor Force Surveys (Statistics Norway, 2003). As the 
Labor Force Survey consists of approximately 22,000 observations per year in total, it follows that the 
evidence with respect to responses in working hours is based on a smaller data set than the one used to 
obtain estimates of the ETI. 
 
Moreover, as these data do not contain any (usable) panel dimension, estimates of responses in 
working hours are obtained by dividing the sample into “treatment group” and “control group” and by 
using a standard difference-in-differences estimation technique on groups in repeated cross-sections, 
see Equation (3.5).20 Individuals that experienced an increase in the net-of-tax rate due to the tax 
reform21 belongs to the treated, and compared to the self-employed experiencing no changes or a 
reduction in the net-of-tax rate. In two specifications, we also include wage earners (experiencing no 
tax changes) in the control group. More information about the data can be found in the Appendix, 
Tables A.3 and A.4 and Figures A.1–A.4, also showing graphical evidence of over time developments. 
 
Table 2 presents response estimates for four alternative specifications, which vary with respect to the 
sample definition and whether the dependent variable is measured in log or level. As explained in 
Section 3, estimates of 𝛿 in Equation (3.5) are used to calculate elasticity estimates that are 
comparable to the overall ETI. The (implied) estimated response ranges from 0.13 to 0.17, but only the 
tax treatment estimate of column (4) is significantly different from zero. In other words, only when 
adding wage earners to the control group, we obtain a statistically significant result for the tax 
treatment variable. However, we see that the point estimate of the regression for the self-employed 
only, reported in column (2), is almost identical to this estimate.  
 
  
                                                     
20 Note that Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) argue that repeated cross-section analysis may be preferable to panel data 
studies in some contexts.  
21 The net-of-tax variable is added to observations of the Labor force survey through personal identification numbers.   
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Table 2. Estimation results for working hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level, large control 
group 
Log, large control 
group 
Tax treatment 0.481 0.016 0.468 0.017* 
 (0.585) (0.015) (0.371) (0.010) 
     
Treatment group 0.232 0.007 3.841*** 0.087*** 
 (0.443) (0.011) (0.270) (0.007) 
     
Constant 28.056*** 3.381*** 35.795*** 3.592*** 
 (3.821) (0.098) (0.792) (0.022) 
     
Age 0.325** 0.008** -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.158) (0.004) (0.020) (0.001) 
     
Age squared -0.004** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Male 5.881*** 0.157*** 3.443*** 0.097*** 
 (0.413) (0.011) (0.061) (0.002) 
     
Number of children -0.795** -0.022** -0.576*** -0.017*** 
 (0.377) (0.010) (0.061) (0.002) 
     
Married 0.009 -0.001 -0.511*** -0.015*** 
 (0.355) (0.009) (0.059) (0.002) 
     
Norwegian born 1.642** 0.046** 0.332*** 0.010*** 
 (0.683) (0.019) (0.114) (0.003) 
Elasticity 0.130 0.169 0.126 0.166 
N 3,664 3,664 64,900 64,900 
Additional control variables: dummy variables for educational field, length of education, county and years. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
4.3 Less tax evasion after the reform? 
Next, we add the tax evasion component to ETI response account, by examining to what extent the 
overall ETI estimate is influenced by changes in the income reporting caused by the tax reform.22 
Table 3 presents separate estimation results for the coefficient 𝑘, before and after the reform, which 
gives the number by which the average self-employed person’s income has to be multiplied in order to 
obtain the “true” income. As discussed in Section 3.3, we are inclined to expect a reduction in tax 
evasion from lower marginal tax rates, and in accordance with this, we see a 2.5 percentage point 
                                                     
22 Table A.6 and Table A.7 in the Appendix provide more information about the data used in this part of the 
analysis, which primarily are from the Survey of consumer expenditure.  
22 
reduction in 𝑘 when moving from the pre-reform to the post-reform tax schedule.23 Note that the 
difference in the estimate of k is not strictly significant, even though we observe a clear reduction in 
the self-employment parameter estimate.24 However, to illustrate the implication of the point estimate 
for k in terms of the overall ETI, a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation suggests that the tax evasion 
component of the ETI is approximately 0.04. This estimate is obtained by calculating the percentage 
change in income evaded due to the reform. Then the “evasion elasticity” is derived by dividing this 
figure by the percentage change in the net-of-tax rate, when restricting to self-employed with higher 
net-of-tax rates (those assumed to react), and then multiplying and dividing with tax evasion and 
income reported before the reform, respectively.  
 
Table 3. Tax evasion before and after the reform 
 Before reform 2003-2004 After reform 2006-2007 
Income 0.597*** 0.554*** 
 (0.043) (0.036) 
   
Self-employed 0.109** 0.087** 
 (0.046) (0.044) 
   
Age 0.033*** 0.045*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
   
Age squared -0.33×10-3*** -0.42×10-3*** 
 (0.72×10-4) (0.72×10-4) 
   
Male -0.026 -0.097*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) 
   
Children under 7 0.115*** 0.117*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) 
   
High school 0.029 0.099*** 
 (0.045) (0.036) 
   
Higher education 0.028 0.149*** 
 (0.048) (0.039) 
   
Constant 1.940*** 2.237*** 
 (0.492) (0.454) 
Tax evasion 1.182** 1.157** 
N 2,221 2,041 
Additional control variables: dummy variables for regions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                                                     
23 Weaknesses in the empirical approach are admitted, although we do not believe them to affect results. For example, ideally 
we would like to use a measure of permanent income when estimating the relation between consumption and income, as is 
done in Nygård, Slemrod and Thoresen (2016). 
24 We use the so-called delta method to calculate standard errors for 𝑘, based on parameter estimates of 𝜅 and 𝜇, see Section 
3.3. 
23 
In terms of a response account, if we exemplify by using the overall ETI estimate obtained by the 
Kopczuk-specification, which is 0.15 (see Table 1), we have 0.15 = 0.17 + 0.04 + 𝑒𝑟, when we have 
used 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 =  𝑒ℎ + 𝑒𝑒𝑣 + 𝑒𝑟 and the estimate of  𝑒ℎ from column 4 of Table 2. However, when 
contrasting the tax evasion estimate to a lower bound estimate for 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡, which is 0.10, (of course) the 
relative importance of tax evasion becomes larger. 
4.4 Implications of organizational shifts  
To obtain information about the extent of organizational shifts over the reform period, information 
from the Business and Enterprise Register (Virksomhet og foretaksregisteret) (Hansson, 2007), the 
Shareholder Register (Aksjonærregisteret) (Statistics Norway, 2015) and the End of the Year 
Certificate register (Lønns- og trekkoppgaveregisteret) (Aukrust et al., 2010) are used. By establishing 
a longitudinal dataset we can verify if the self-employed have moved their business activities from 
self-employment to an incorporated firm, and assess to what extent these movements have been 
altered by the reform, and thereby representing a source to estimation bias. An organizational shift is 
defined by moving from self-employment (as defined above) to be an employee in an incorporated 
firm, in combination with holding shares in the same firm. See Table A.8 and Table A.9 in the 
Appendix for more information about the “shifters”. 
 
Table 4. Self-employed in year t who have incorporated in year t+1, t+2, and t+3, 2001–2011 
 1 year difference 2 year difference 3 year difference 
T Number Percent of self-
employed 
Number Percent of self-
employed 
Number Percent of 
self-
employed 
2001 -  -  5,611 4.14 
       
2002 -  4,275 3.13 5,724 4.20 
       
2003 2,617 2.08 4,293 3.41 4,370 3.45 
       
2004 3,187 2.38 3,716 2.78 6,138 4.59 
       
2005 2,458 1.78 5,482 3.96 7,160 5.18 
       
2006 2,053 1.57 4,206 3.22 5,464 4.18 
       
2007 2,045 1.56 3,828 2.91 5,130 3.89 
       
2008 1,413 1.14 2,968 2.39 4,113 3.31 
       
2009 1,553 1.26 3,012 2.44 4,549 3.69 
       
2010 1,482 1.20 3,452 2.79 - - 
       
2011 1,550 1.29 - - - - 
 
24 
This part of the analysis is constrained by information from the Shareholder Register only being 
available from 2004 and onwards, which implies that 2004 is the first year with information about the 
owner/employment combination in incorporated firms. Correspondingly, in Table 4, we show the 
number of shifts in the period from 2001 to 2011, dependent on time intervals, with the organizational 
form of 2001 represented by the 2004-choice. As expected, the figures of Table 4 indicate that there is 
a reduction in the movement out of self-employment after the reform. If we focus on the three-year 
differences, we see that the average share of the self-employed having changed organizational form is 
reduced from 4.1, before the reform (2001–2004), to 3.6, after the reform (2007–2009).   
 
To illustrate how changes in these movements work on the ETI estimate, we do some crude 
adjustments in data, where we modify the sample used in the estimations for the reduction in 
organizational shifts, and re-estimate the ETI on the new sample. We use information about the 
individuals that shift before the reform to find self-employed individuals after the reform with similar 
characteristics, to obtain a data set with unaltered organizational shift patterns over time. In practice, 
this implies that 1,100 individuals are taken out of the samples in 2008, 2009, and 2010 by random 
draws based on “shifting characteristics”.25 We acknowledge that this a somewhat simple procedure to 
obtain magnitudes, but recall that our main ambition here is to provide illustrations of the effect of the 
response dimensions that may represent sources to bias. 
 
Table 5. ETI estimates when accounting for changed organizational shift patterns after the 
reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net-of-tax rate -0.948*** 0.129*** 0.137*** 0.177*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
     
Log of period t (Auten/Carroll)  X   
     
Log of period t income in splines (Gruber/Saez) 
 
Splines of log t‐1 income and log deviation 
between t‐1 and t incomes (Kopczuk) 
   
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
N 433,707 433,707 433,707 372,105 
Control variables: age, age squared, male, children, married, Norwegian born, educational field, length of education, county 
and years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
ETI estimates for this alternative data set are presented in Table 5, and we see that the ETI estimates of 
Table 5 are higher than those reported in Table 1. For example, the estimate for 𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡∗  is 0.18 according 
                                                     
25 These following characteristics are those in which the individuals who have shifted organizational form differ most from 
the average self-employed: age, business income and the income base of the surtax. In addition, random draws are done 
separately for males and females and for different education levels, to obtain similar group compositions before the reform.  
25 
to column (4). Thus, this suggests that the standard ETI estimate (in this case) is biased downward 
because of the measurement errors stemming from organizational shifts. Thus, the response account is 
now changed to 0.18 = 0.17 + 0.04 + 𝑒𝑟. 
4.5 Contribution of tax base shifts  
Finally, we bring up the implication of shifts across tax bases for the measurement of the ETI. Similar 
to as for the organizational shift response, new patterns of shifts across tax bases enforces a possible 
bias in the estimation of the ETI. To fully understand the implications of this effect, we would benefit 
from a thorough empirical analysis founded on taxpayers’ decision-making with respect to business 
income and capital income, accounting both for real responses and income shifting. As this is beyond 
the scope of the present analysis, we instead provide some simplified illustrations.  
 
We focus on differential income developments for taxpayers in the treatment group, i.e., among 
persons who experienced an increase in the net-of-tax rate because of the reform. Figure 2 and Figure 
3 show how business income (as defined by the income base for the surtax) and capital income evolve 
over time for the treated, separately for groups with initial low and high capital incomes. Initial high 
capital income means that the person receives more than 50,000 NOK in capital income in the years 
prior to the reform. Figure 3 illustrates that dividend income is substantially reduced after the reform,26 
see the sizeable drop between 2005 and 2006 for taxpayers with high income from capital. For the 
same group, in Figure 2, we observe an increase in business income soon after the reform, even though 
the curve flattens out in the subsequent years and also goes back. Moreover, in Table 6 we report 
separate ETI estimates for the four groups which are focused at in Figure 2 and in Figure 3.27 
                                                     
26 As seen elsewhere, see Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009) and Thoresen et al. (2012). 
27 See Table A.10 and Table A.11 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics for the groups. 
26 
Figure 2.  Developments in the surtax base income for taxpayers with lower marginal tax rates 
after tax reform, separately for high and low capital income earners   
 
Figure 3.  Developments in capital income for those with lower marginal tax rates after tax 
reform, separately for high and low capital income earners 
 
 
As expected, given the patterns seen in the graphs, the ETI estimate for the self-employed who also 
have high capital income prior to the reform, 0.4, is large compared to what is found in the “low-
capital” income group. We take this as corroborative evidence of taxpayers in this former group, 
27 
because of the tax changes, having decided to receive less capital income after the reform, and instead 
receive compensation in terms of more business income. This type of shifts represents a source to 
measurement error in the estimation of the overall ETI, and causes an upward bias in the ETI.28 
 
Table 6. ETI estimates for subgroups of the self-employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 High capital 
income  
Low capital 
income  
High surtax tax 
base 
Low surtax tax 
base 
Net-of-tax rate 0.401*** 0.124*** 0.200*** 0.147*** 
 (0.100) (0.017) (0.057) (0.017) 
N 17,763 351,309 57,473 316,853 
Instrumental variable estimation (2SLS), with splines of log t‐1 income and log deviation between t‐1 and t incomes 
(Kopczuk) as mean reversion control. Control variables: age, age squared, male, children, married, Norwegian born, dummies 
for educational field, education level, county and years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
However, we admit that the evidence is indicative, and as there may be other sources to heterogeneity 
too, it is hard to be very precise about the magnitude. Moreover, as this group is relatively small, we 
may expect that the effect of tax base shifting has limited effect on estimates of the ETI. This is also 
substantiated by observing small differences between the response of the “low-capital-income” group 
(Table 6) and the average response for all (reported in Table 1). 
5. Conclusion 
The “sufficient statistics” interpretation of the ETI has received a lot of attention in applied public 
finance recently. A major attraction of the approach is that one does not need to address the behavioral 
anatomy of the ETI. However, in this paper we warn against neglecting the effects of various response 
dimensions, as they can create biases in the estimation of the ETI. To differentiate between different 
types of response margins, conceptually, we have divided our empirical investigations into 
“decompositions” and “sources to bias”. Access to several data sets, mainly from Norwegian 
administrative registers, has been essential for this analysis probing deeper into the various effects 
underlying the overall ETI, and how they fit into a response account. 
 
The ETI estimates for the self-employed obtained here are relatively small, in the range from 0.09 to 
0.15, which is close to findings for Denmark, reported in Kleven and Schultz (2014), and considerably 
smaller than found for the U.S. by Heim (2010). Further, the decomposition analysis shows that 
effects on working hours is the dominant response margin, but we also attribute some of the overall 
                                                     
28 Note that Gordon and Slemrod (2000) and Goolsbee (2000) find that income shifting is increasing in income. 
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tax response to tax evasion, for the latter effect finding evidence suggesting that tax evasion is 
increasing in the marginal tax rate.  
 
However, the main message of the present study is that such estimates (and thereby also international 
comparisons of estimates) are in danger of being misleading if not controlling for confounding factors 
in the identification of the ETI. We find indications of more people staying in self-employment after 
the 2006-reform, due to fewer organizational shifts, which represents a source to downward bias in the 
ETI. Further, shifts in payments across tax bases within the personal income tax schedule, because of 
harmonization of marginal tax rates on earnings and capital income, works in the other direction. Most 
likely the organizational shift bias is most important of the two: a tentative result suggests that the ETI 
would have been 0.03 higher if the organizational shift effect did not contaminate the ETI estimate.  
 
Finally, we assert that more investigations of the multiple behavioral components of the ETI benefit 
the understanding of it, both in a national and an international context. Such examinations are 
demanding with respect to data, but with increased access to larger and richer data sources in the 
future, we expect to see more studies along the line of the present analysis.  
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Appendix A: Summary statistics 
A.1 Income data 
Table A.1. Average income and net-of-tax rate, 2001–2010 
 Reported income Net-of-tax rate Self-employed individuals 
Year Mean Mean Number 
2001 299,782 0.576 71,353 
 (307,815) (0.074)  
    2002 316,467 0.583 72,590 
 (290,482) (0.073)  
    2003 317,794 0.589 72,103 
 (293,629) (0.072)  
    2004 377,000 0.584 74,257 
 (316,001) (0.073)  
    2005 397,739 0.594 74,749 
 (391,337) (0.063)  
    2006 431,448 0.601 76,220 
 (421,270) (0.050)  
    2007 468,548 0.595 77,781 
 (436,927) (0.052)  
    2008 452,082 0.597 77,380 
 (393,619) (0.052)  
    2009 451,961 0.600 77,485 
 (406,667) (0.051)  
    2010 469,104 0.600 77,701 
 (427,944) (0.051)  
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for control variables in the estimation of the ETI 
Characteristic Mean Length of education Percentage in 
sample 
Educational field Percentage in 
sample 
Male 0.75 No education 0.1 General 31.2 
      Age 46.0 Primary school 0.1 Humanities and arts 4.5 
      Dummy for children 0.59 Secondary school 19.8 Teaching 2.1 
      Married 0.57 High school, started 25.5 Social science and 
law 
3.4 
      Birth country 0.93 High school, completed 28.8 Business and 
administration 
9.3 
        High school, supplement 2.4 Science, crafts and 
technology 
24.9 
        University, undergrad 12.5 Health, social and 
sports 
11.5 
        University postgrad 9.18 Agriculture and 
fishery 
5.5 
        Research degree 0.3 Transport, security 
and services 
5.6 
        Unknown 1.3 Unknown 1.8 
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A.2 Working hours data 
Table A.3. Hours of work and net-of-tax rate in groups, before and after the reform 
 Treated Small control group Large control group 
 Hours of work Net-of-tax 
rate 
Hours of work Net-of-tax 
rate 
Hours of work Net-of-tax 
rate 
Before reform 41.3 0.517 42.2 0.618 36.2 0.625 
 (9.1) (0.055) (9.6) (0.053) (6.3) (0.047) 
       After reform 40.7 0.558 41.0 0.615 35.7 0.624 
 (9.1) (0.043) (9.7) (0.044) (6.6) (0.038) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table A.4. Descriptive statistics for control variables involved in the working hours estimation 
 Treated Small control group Large control group 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Male 0.80 0.78 0.49 
    Age 48.0 47.3 40.9 
    Child 0.63 0.61 0.57 
    Married 0.61 0.62 0.50 
    Birth country 0.93 0.95 0.94 
 Treated Small control group Large control group 
Length of education Percentage Percentage Percentage 
No education 0.0 0.0 0.1 
    Primary school 0.1 0.0 0.1 
    Secondary school 15.0 20.3 14.3 
    High school, started 16.2 30.9 18.5 
    High school, completed 
 
High school, supplement 
 
University, undergrad. 
 
University, postgrad. 
 
Research degree 
 
Unknown 
24.3 
 
2.0 
 
18.0 
 
22.0 
 
0.7 
 
1.7 
33.3 
 
2.6 
 
9.1 
 
3.5 
 
0.0 
 
0.5 
34.0 
 
3.4 
 
28.8 
 
3.7 
 
0.2 
 
0.9 
    Educational field    
General 22.6 34.8 24.5 
    Humanities and arts 4.2 3.8 4.4 
    Teaching 2.2 2.3 7.5 
    Social science and law 7.4 1.2 2.2 
    Business and administration 
 
Science, crafts and technology 
 
Health, social and sports 
 
Agriculture and fishery  
 
Transport, security and services 
 
Unknown 
8.7 
 
21.6 
 
24.9 
 
3.0 
 
3.5 
 
2.0 
11.2 
 
30.0 
 
5.6 
 
4.7 
 
5.6 
 
0.9 
13.9 
 
26.1 
 
15.6 
 
1.1 
 
3.1 
 
1.5 
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Figure A.1. Average working hours for the treatment and the control group. Only self-employed 
in control group 
 
 
Figure A.2. Difference in average working hours between the treatment group and the control 
group. Only self-employed (not wage earners) in the control group 
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Figure A.3. Average working hours for the treatment group and the control group. Both wage 
earners and self-employed in the control group 
 
 
Figure A.4. Difference in average working hours between the treatment group and the control 
group. Wage earners and self-employed in control group 
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Table A.5. Placebo-test, using comparison of 2001 and 2002 versus 2004 and 2005 in the 
identification of the response in working hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Level Log Level, large control 
group 
Log, large control 
group 
Tax treatment -0.571 -0.015 0.181 0.003 
 (0.860) (0.022) (0.539) (0.014) 
     Treated 0.412 0.012 3.782*** 0.087*** 
 (0.591) (0.015) (0.357) (0.009) 
     Constant 31.812*** 3.460*** 38.737*** 3.660*** 
 (5.516) (0.140) (1.089) (0.031) 
Elasticity -0.152 -0.165 0.049 0.031 
N 1,763 1,763 30,501 30,501 
Additional control variables: age, age squared, dummy variables for male, children, married, Norwegian born, dummies, 
educational field, length of education, county and years. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
A.3 Expenditure data 
Table A.6. Average income and food consumption, self-employed and wage earners, 2003–2007 
 Self-employed Wage earners Self-employed 
 Income  Food consumption Income Food consumption individuals 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Number 
2003 472,001 49,013 454,463 44,432 99 
 (239,176) (25,259) (250,193) (23,896)  
      2004 494,889 51,956 484,997 43,204 95 
 (220,883) (24270) (779,194) (22,739)  
      2005 680,560 52,252 508,431 46,586 77 
 (967,065) (28047) (478,743) (25,987)  
      2006 542,039 57,406 503,499 47,970 83 
 (270,838) (32358) (266,367) (28,095)  
      2007 653,805 60,977 550,958 51,493 90 
 (440,945) (41758) (285,587) (30,057)  
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Table A.7. Descriptive statistics for control variables used in the estimation of the tax evasion 
equation 
 Self-employed Wage earners 
 Mean Mean 
Male 0.75 0.71 
   Age 46.8 46.1 
   Number of children under 7 0.35 0.38 
   High school 0.52 0.49 
   Higher education 0.30 0.36 
   Geographical area:   
South 0.13 0.14 
   West 0.19 0.17 
   East 0.30 0.29 
   North 0.10 0.13 
   Centre 0.13 0.11 
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A.4 Organizational shifts 
Table A.8. Average income and average net-of-tax rate for business owners who have shifted 
organizational form, 2001–2010 
 1 year difference 2 year difference 3 year difference 
 Reported income Net-of-tax rates Reported 
income 
Net-of-tax 
rates 
Reported 
income 
Net-of-tax 
rates 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
2001 - - - - 444,254 0.544 
     (450,510) (0.073) 
       
2002 - - 446,307 0.553 434,569 0.556 
   (444,379) (0.076) (361,171) (0.076) 
       
2003 435,131 0.561 441,696 0.560 460,684 0.557 
 (342,879) (0.076) (352,901) (0.077) (362,801) (0.077) 
       
2004 475,294 0.557 501,147 0.553 502,460 0.554 
 (394,847) (0.076) (422,634) (0.076) (445,025) (0.077) 
       
2005 527,857 0.570 537,242 0.568 536,059 0.569 
 (454,809) (0.067) (577,083) (0.067) (574,669) (0.067) 
       
2006 534,519 0.587 561,280 0.584 565,636 0.583 
 (672,008) (0.051) (682,917) (0.051) (639,809) (0.051) 
       
2007  617,470 0.576 624,409 0.574 675,159 0.574 
 (659,741) (0.052) (682,356) (0.052) (939,840) (0.052) 
       
2008 625,217 0.576 676,382 0.574 652,925 0.574 
 (616,047) (0.052) (689,165) (0.052) (571,878) (0.052) 
       
2009 672,478 0.581 643,848 0.580 638,629 0.579 
 (654,334) (0.053) (578,687) (0.053) (507,689) (0.053) 
       
2010 640,147 0.579 667,399 0.577 - - 
 (669,822) (0.052) (586,281) (0.052)   
       
2011 691,551 0.580 - - - - 
 (564,110) (0.053)     
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table A.9. Summary statistics for business owners who have shifted organizational form 
 1 year difference 2 year difference 3 year difference 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Male 0.84 0.82 0.82 
    
Age 45.7 44.4 44.0 
    
Children 0.54 0.54 0.56 
    
Married 0.53 0.52 0.54 
    
Birth country 0.93 0.92 0.92 
Length of education Percentage Percentage Percentage 
    
No education 0.1 0.1 0.1 
    
Primary school 0.1 0.1 0.1 
    
Secondary school 12.9 12.9 12.4 
    
High school, started 17.3 16.4 17.4 
    
High school, completed 
 
High school, supplement 
 
University, undergrad 
 
University, postgrad 
 
Research degree 
 
Unknown 
31.4 
 
3.7 
 
20.4 
 
11.9 
 
0.6 
 
1.7 
33.2 
 
3.9 
 
18.8 
 
11.9 
 
0.5 
 
2.2 
33.5 
 
3.7 
 
18.3 
 
11.9 
 
0.5 
 
2.0 
    
Educational field    
    
General 23.1 22.4 21.9 
    
Humanities and arts 4.3 4.2 4.1 
    
Teaching 2.4 2.5 2.5 
    
Social science and law 4.2 3.8 3.7 
    
Business and administration 
 
Science, crafts and 
technology 
 
Health, social and sports 
 
Agriculture and fishery  
 
Transport, security and 
services 
 
Unknown 
16.2 
 
 
31.0 
 
 
7.8 
 
4.4 
 
4.5 
 
 
2.3 
14.9 
 
 
32.7 
 
 
8.4 
 
3.7 
 
4.8 
 
 
2.7 
14.9 
 
 
33.2 
 
 
8.7 
 
3.6 
 
5.0 
 
 
2.4 
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A.5 Tax base shifts 
Table A.10. Average income and net-of-tax rate, individuals with high capital income, 2001–2010 
 Reported income Capital income Net-of-tax rates Individuals 
 Mean Mean Mean Number 
2001 852,065 308,591 0.499 2,060 
 (1,079,629) (1,370,927) (0.059)  
     2002 820,416 401,615 0.506 2,060 
 (840,738) (1,087,694) (0.066)  
     2003 836,990 584,113 0.507 2,060 
 (796,559) (1,480,621) (0.064)  
     2004 982,620 599,099 0.482 2,007 
 (842,372) (2072016) (0.029)  
     2005 1,122,599 702,232 0.522 2,037 
 (1,402,704) (4,026,147) (0.052)  
     2006 1,079,232 249,110 0.549 2,020 
 (421,270) (927,780) (0.040)  
     2007 1,085,802 312,576 0.545 2,038 
 (1,380,178) (1,073,619) (0.039)  
     2008 1,059,292 341,540 0.546 2,060 
 (1,041,310) (1,802,044) (0.041)  
     2009 980,989 229,444 0.549 2,060 
 (1,047,123) (1,047,123) (0.043)  
     2010 1,015,565 419,871 0.550 2,060 
 (1,125,656) (2,334,001) (0.044)  
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table A.11. Average income and net-of-tax rate, individuals with high taxable income (surtax 
base), 2001–2010 
 Reported income Capital income Net-of-tax rates Individuals 
 Mean Mean Mean Number 
2001 739,011 85,320 0.489 9,787 
 (612,401) (658,599) (0.044)  
     2002 788,113 100,654 0.482 9,787 
 (522,742) (463,077) (0.033)  
     2003 864,755 144,844 0.482 9,787 
 (482,658) (733,068) (0.033)  
     2004 916,140 95,294 0.481 9,761 
 (526,157) (811,522) (0.033)  
     2005 950,512 137,497 0.509 9,762 
 (772,833) (1,793,101) (0.034)  
     2006 960,457 66,185 0.539 9,733 
 (832,186) (478,417) (0.027)  
     2007 1,013,969 91,821 0.534 9,731 
 (848,912) (495,475) (0.027)  
     2008 1,012,546 90,316 0.536 9,787 
 (678,156) (583,147) (0.052)  
     2009 1,000,615 62,706 0.539 9,787 
 (608,657) (499,489) (0.033)  
     2010 1,015,800 154,494 0.540 9,787 
 (707,409) (2,081,587) (0.035)  
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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